![]() In special cases, we show that these two methods are algebraically equivalent. In this letter, we propose an alternative method called “regression-with-residuals” (RWR) for estimating the CDE. To estimate the CDE, Vansteelandt (2009) and Joffe and Greene (2009) developed the method of sequential g-estimation, which was introduced to political science by Acharya et al. A comparison between the total effect and the CDE, then, helps to adjudicate whether the mediator of interest “explains” the effect of treatment on the outcome. The CDE measures the strength of the causal relationship between a treatment and outcome when a putative mediator is fixed at a given value. Political scientists have become increasingly interested in causal mediation, and to this end, recent studies focus on estimating a quantity called the controlled direct effect (CDE). The conclusions suggest that autocrats might adopt multiple targeting strategies to respond to different threats to their survival, sometimes rewarding threatening groups to buy their acquiescence. ![]() ![]() Using survey data, I also find that distribution in Ramadan translates into reputational gains for the regime, particularly among its critics. The findings show that the government reports more economic distribution in places where political threats are higher: more socioeconomically developed, more contentious, and more affected by unpopular austerity measures. I test this argument using an original municipality-level dataset of government-reported provision of economic benefits. Why do autocrats distribute in Ramadan? And, who do they target? Focusing on Egypt (2014-2020), this paper argues that the regime distributes in Ramadan to contain political threats to its survival by co-opting areas where such threats are more credible. In many Muslim societies, autocrats expand their distributive policies in the religious season of Ramadan. Significantly, we find no systematic evidence for surges of violence associated with any Islamic holiday, including Ramadan. Consistent with our theory, we find that important Islamic holidays witness systematic declines in violence-as much as 41%-and provide evidence that anticipation of societal disapproval is producing these results. We assess our theory using innovative parallel analysis of multiple datasets and qualitative evidence from Islamic insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan from 2004 to 2014. We argue that militant actors anticipate societal disapproval of violence, predictably inducing restraint on these days. This study develops a new theory that predicts systematic suppression of violence on important Islamic holidays, those marked by public days off for dedicated celebration. Does the religious calendar promote or suppress political violence in Islamic societies? This study challenges the presumption that the predominant impact of the Islamic calendar is to increase violence, particularly during Ramadan.
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